CO129-590-25 Accounts of events leading up to surrender and subsequent treatment of prisoners- etc 23-4-1942 - 28-9-1943 — Page 67

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staffs. Their advice was, however, clearly and definitely in favour of cessation of hostilities. My civilian colleagues were of the same mind. Their view, which was the same as my own, was that there was no alternative but for me to exercise the discretion given me in an earlier telegram for use when effective resistance was no longer possible.

9.

I would here state that both at this stage and throughout the preceding course of hostilities the support of my civil and military advisers was of incalculable assistance to me. In quoting their views I have no intention of obscuring the fact that the decision to be made was my responsibility alone.

10.

I once again telephoned to General Maltby and asked whether there was not any possibility of holding the enemy in the Wanchai sector. General Maltby called Colonel Stewart for a further appreciation which confirmed his earlier report. I then ordered the General and the Commodore to take the necessary steps to bring about a cessation of hostilities.

It

11.

It may be said here that there was one section of our forces which was outside the areas mentioned hitherto, namely, that on Stanley Peninsula. I do not propose to mention the operations in this sector in detail and they will doubtless be made clear in military commentaries. will suffice if I say that the existence of this force was taken into consideration in our councils and it was agreed that it would be unable to affect the situation by counter- attack or otherwise.

12.

After the necessary immediate action had been taken, which included sending a telegram to the Colonial Office (in plain language), I requested the General and the Commodore to come to Government House, there to await the expected arrival of the Japanese. After waiting some time a verbal message, brought by the two officers sent to inform the Japanese of the cessation of hostilities, was received; it was to the effect that unless the G.O.C. and myself proceeded at once and in person to the local Japanese Headquarters, the attack would be re-opened at a stated time, which I believe was 6.30 P.M.

I con-

13.

Although I was most reluctant to do so, sidered it best to comply. Accordingly General Maltby and I proceeded through the lines at Wanchai whence we were taken in a Japanese car to the local Japanese Headquarters. After some delay and difficulty in interpretation, I confirmed that the order to cease fire had been given, except to the forces at Stanley with which communication was impossible; arrangements were then made to send a message there by road. The local Japanese Commander then stated that he would countermand his order to attack and apparently did so. In reply to further questions, General Maltby and I stated that we realised that we were prisoners of war.

We were then informed that we would be taken to Kowloon to meet the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant- General Sakal. We were taken across the harbour in a Japanese motor boat and conducted to the Peninsular Hotel where we met General Sakal and his staff.

14.

I again confirmed that the order to cease fire had been given and at the same time made it clear that I had only come in person as a result of the Japanese threat General Sakai to re-open the attack if I failed to do so. asked whether the surrender was unconditional, and I replied that I had no conditions to make. A long discussion followed, in the course of which I protested against the

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